ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT) is the internetworking of terminal physical devices depends on application programming interfaces and sensors to be connected to the Internet for collecting and exchanging data. According to the characteristics of IoT, it can provide rich services for the terminal user. However, the centralized cloud computing-based storage architecture in IoT faces many challenges, such as data security, identity privacy, and high latency. To overcome these challenges, this paper introduces an IoT network storage architecture based on mobile edge computing, which not only achieves low-latency message response and computation offloading of the terminal user but also preserves identity-privacy of the terminal user. Afterward, we presented a novel non-interactive pairing-free ID-based proxy re-signature scheme (ID-PRS), which is a kernel technique to construct the aforementioned storage architecture. Compared with most of proxy re-signature schemes constructed based on traditional public-key-infrastructure, the proposed scheme avoids expensive pairing operation and intricate certificate-maintenance. And it is demonstrated to be provably secure under the classic security assumptions: integer factoring problem and the RSA assumption. Finally, in contrast to the other two ID-PRS schemes, the proposed ID-PRS scheme has more advantages in terms of security, functionability, and computation costs. Thus, it is very suitable to be applied to the resource-constrained mobile users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things is the concept of connecting physical devices to the Internet and to other connected objects. The IoT devices and physical objects with embedded sensors constitute an enormous Internet of Things platform, which can offer or predict the most valuable information for some applications used to address specific requirements by integrating data from the heterogeneous devices and applying data analytics. Although IoT devices are resource-constrained, they produce a huge amount of data due to a mass of IoT devices, large-scale IoT deployments . To obtain the rich benefits from the IoT, it is essential to provide adequate networking and computing resources to implement fast response for IoT applications. Cloud Computing becomes the main booster
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of IoT applications due to its adequate storage capacity and data processing capacity. In cloud computing-based storage architecture, all terminal data needs to be uploaded to the centralized cloud center, and after they are processed, the results are returned to the terminal devices. Due to being far from the end-users, this kind of storage architecture brings tremendous pressures to network bandwidth and transmission cost. Furthermore, network performance will worsen with increasing data size. It results in high latency of the networks. Obviously, it is unacceptable for time-sensitive IoT applications.
Instead of migrating data to the cloud, it may be more efficient to transfer the applications, storage, and processing closer to the place in which the data is produced by the IoT devices. To handle the aforesaid problem, Mobile edge computing (MEC) technology can be introduced [10] . As one extension of cloud computing services, MEC bridges the gap between the centralized-cloud architecture and the decentralised cyber-physical devices on the networking edge. The terminal user can offload its computation task to the edge servers/nodes via a wireless access node. Thus, MEC plays very important roles in promoting the applications of resource-limited devices in mobile cellular networks.
As is known to all, IoT devices are in the open networks, data is transmitted in the open channel, and the user's identity privacy and data security are confronted with great security threats. In the IoT environment, most IoT devices have limitations in terms of energy capacity, storage capacity and computing power, it makes that conventional security measures cannot be directly implemented in resource-constrained IoT devices. Various types of light-weight digital signature schemes, such as ID-based signature and online/offline signature, are proposed to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the IoT data transmitted over open channels. According to digital signature's property, anyone can verify the validity of the signature by the signer's public key. In verify phase, these schemes suffer from private information leakage of the signer since the identity or public key of the signer is needed. Thus, it becomes an important challenge how to ensure data integrity without leaking public key information since it contradicts non-reputation of digital signature.
Let us consider the following scenario. For a hospital ID A , it serves many patients every day. And to make treatment plan and analyze the disease, each patient's medical data record needs to be uploaded to cloud service center which may be rented by the hospital. Nevertheless, cloud service center may not directly receive data from the patient since the patient does not rent storage service of this cloud service center. Furthermore, the patient doesn't want to reveal its individual medical data to the third party. It is a challenge to how to construct a data storage system which can tackle the above problem. Fortunately, proxy pre-signature [5] is a suitable candidate to deal with the problem above since in the proxy pre-signature scheme a semi-trusted proxy can translate a signature of an entity into a signature of another entity on the identical data m. Thus, By applying proxy re-signature technique, it can not only make cloud service center to regard the patient's data as the data from the hospital, but also conceal the patient's identity.
In MEC, terminal devices are resource-constrained. However, most of existing proxy re-signature schemes are based on PKI and use time-consuming pairing operation. It will increase the burden of them if existing proxy re-signature algorithm is directly applied to terminal devices. Thus, the goal in this work is to design a light-weight proxy re-signature scheme which avoids expensive pairing operation and intricate certificate management.
Our Contribution: In order to construct a non-interactive secure proxy re-signature scheme and avoid expensive pairing computation in the ID-based cryptography,in this work, we presented a pairing-free ID-based proxy re-signature scheme which is an important component for constructing our data storage architecture in MEC. Our proposed scheme not only removes expensive pairing operation and intricate certificate-maintenance, but also is non-interactive. Finally, it is shown to be secure against inside attack and outside attack in the Ateniese-Hohenberger security model [24] . Compared with the two recent ID-PRS schemes and Shao et al.'s scheme, our proposed ID-PRS scheme has more advantages in terms of security, functionability and computation costs.
II. RELATED WORK
To address the challenges faced by physical storage, cloud storage concept was proposed by Google in 2006. Cloud storage can afford virtually unlimited computing capability and storage capacity over the internet. In cloud storage, all data generated by terminal devices needs to be uploaded to and processed in distant clouds. However, when billions of terminal devices are connected, this centralized data storage architecture is already becoming impractical, especially time-sensitive applications, since the delay problem caused by network congestion will be very serious [4] . To tackle this problem, an emerging concept mobile edge computing (MEC) has been introduced [10] , which resides in between the cloud and terminal devices. It is closer to the data source.
Up to now, MEC concept is only discussed from a theoretical perspective. Whereas, there are some related concepts that are similar to MEC concept for example mobile cloud computing (MCC) and fog computing, where mobile cloud computing is closely related to mobile edge computing. To guarantee the data security, Alqahtani and KouadriMostefaou [11] proposed a data storage framework based on distributed multi-cloud storage and data compression. The data is split into the segments, then all segments are uploaded to distributed multi-cloud after they are encrypted and compressed. However, for improving security purpose, data user needs to store one segment on local device. The purpose of using multi-cloud technique is to reduce the harm caused by a compromised cloud sever. In [7] and [8] , the authors makes use of homomorphic encryption to realize data security storage. Recently, Zhang et al. [28] proposed an ID-based data storage scheme in fog computing based on proxy reencryption. The aforementioned data storage schemes mainly aim at the security of data content. However, the ownership security of data content is not considered.
Proxy re-signature (PRS) notion was firstly defined by Blaze et al. [5] . In a PRS scheme, a semi-trusted party (the proxy) is capable of translating a signature from Alice (the delegatee) into a signature from Bob(the delegator) on the identical data m by a re-signing key. Nevertheless, the proxy is unable to create a valid message-signature in name of the delegatee or the delegator independently. In 2005, Ateniese and Hohenberger proposed a formal PRS's security model based on the adversary types and instantiated two concrete schemes: a single-use PRS and a multi-use PRS in [6] . After this seminal work [6] , various PRS schemes [9] , [14] - [17] , [29] with special properties have been proposed successively to satisfy practical requirement. These PRS schemes are divided into interactive PRS schemes and non-interactive PRS schemes according to whether or not the delegatee participates in re-signing key generation phase. In an interactive PRS scheme, only if the delegator and the delegatee cooperate, re-signing key can be generated. However, in the non-interactive PRS scheme, re-signing key can be independently produced by a delegator. Thus, the non-interactive PRS scheme is more flexible. To achieve the user's identity privacy and secure data storage, we use proxy re-signature technique as an important build block to construct data storage in mobile edge computing.
To the best of the authors' knowledge, most PRS schemes are built on traditional public-key-infrastructure (PKI). In PKI, when the signer's public key is employed, its validity needs to be authenticated by a certificate issued by a certifier authority (CA). Whereas, maintenance of certificate might bring a heavy burden to the signer.
To remove intricate certificate maintenance, Shamir pioneered the idea of identity-based PKC (ID-PKC) in [18] . In the ID-based PKC, the user's unique identification information such as cell-phone number, identity-card number, e-mail address, etc., acts as its public key. ID-PKC abandons the inevitability for public key certificates, so that it makes that intricate certificate maintenance is avoided. ID-based PRS concept(for short, ID-PRS) was firstly put forth by Shao et al. [16] . Their scheme is a secure multi-use ID-PRS scheme in the standard model. However, their scheme was shown to insecure in [30] . Subsequently, Hu et al. also proposed a novel ID-PRS scheme based on a harder mathematics problem in [14] . In 2015, Tian [19] presented an efficient ID-PRS scheme based on lattice cryptography in the ROM, but the practicability of their scheme is very weak since its signature length and computation costs are very large. Recently, Wang et al. put forth two ID-based pairing-free PRS schemes in [2] . Although the two schemes are efficient, they exist universal forgery attack, anyone can forge a signature on an arbitrary message. In 2018, Yang et al. presented a revocable identity-based PRS scheme in [22] , but their scheme is interactive.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this part, we review security assumptions and interrelated mathematics knowledge which are the basic knowledge required throughout the paper.
A. NOTIONS
For convenience, Table 1 shows quiet a few mathematic symbols and some abbreviations which are used in the remaining context.
B. MATHEMATIC HARDNESS PROBLEM 1) THE RSA PROBLEM
Given an RSA public key (N , e) and ciphertext y = x e mod N , to compute x.
The RSA assumption is that the RSA Problem is hard to solve when the modulus N is a randomly chosen and sufficiently large modular number, and the ciphertext y is a random integer between 0 and N − 1.
2) LARGE INTEGER FACTORIZATION PROBLEM
Let N denote a composite-integer which is written as N = p · q,where p, q are two large primes, its target is to seek its decompositions p and q. It is known to all that it is a very hard problem to seek a PPT algorithm Alg to factorize N .
3) LARGE INTEGER FACTORIZATION ASSUMPTION
Let l be a security parameter, N = pq is a composite-integer, where p and q are two l-bits large primes, we named that the (t R , ε R )-large composite-integer factorization assumption holds if no t T -probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary is capable of decomposing the composite-integer N with a non-negligible probability ε R .
Lemma 1: Let N = p 0 ·q 0 be a product of primes p 0 and q 0 , for α ∈ R Q N and α = 1, we have α 2ρ ≡ α mod N where
Note that: for a quadratic residue α, it should have four diverse square roots, namely ±r 1 and ±r 2 . Only when r 1 = ±r 2 mod N holds, N can be factorized by utilizing GCD(r 1 − r 2 , N ) or GCD(r 1 + r 2 , N ). Therefore, it means that given two diverse roots, the probability of factoring N is 
4) THE EXTENDED EUCLIDEAN ALGORITHM
For any a, b ∈ Z N , where a, b = 0, there exists an efficient algorithm which can output two integers x ∈ Z N and y ∈ Z N such that
IV. STORAGE ARCHITECTURE FOR IOT BASE ON MEC
A. SYSTEM MODEL For MEC storage architecture in IoT, its system model is illustrated as Fig. 1 . This architecture is roughly divided into three layers, cloud computing layer, mobile edge computing layer and the End-user layer.
• Cloud computing layer. It is a centralized cloud computing platform with sufficient storage resource and computation resources in the layer. It is responsible for handling less-time sensitive data and providing long-term data storage for end-users.
• MEC layer.The cloud layer can connect with mobile edge computing layer through Internet or private network. It consists of mobile edge device, mobile edge server and edge switch. This layer can aggregate, encrypt and transform the raw local data in real-time.
And it can also provide limited computation and storage services. In our architecture, it servers as the proxy and is responsible for converting the end-user's signature into its signature in order to ensure the privacy of the end-user's identity. The end-user is capable of offloading its computation task to MEC server in this layer.
In our system, we suppose that all devices in MEC layer are honest-but-curious, and can honestly execute the assigned tasks.
• The end-user layer. The layer mainly consists of many resource-constrainted end-user devices such as cell phone, sensors, electronic bracelet, Apple Watch and so on. They can connect MEC server via base station in mobile cellular networks. In our architecture, they act as the delegatee. They produce the signature on the outsourced data and upload them to the cloud via MEC. Meanwhile, they can make data-query to MEC to retrieve data.
B. OUR STORAGE ARCHITECTURE
For the sake of easy comprehension, let us take the hospital's electronic health record storage system as an example. The storage architecture includes four entities: PKG, the hospital, the end-user and the cloud. PKG is a private key generator. It is responsible to calculate private key of the end-user. Let ID A be the identity of the hospital administrator, it is a trusted entity. And the cloud only stores the data which is authenticated by the hospital administrator ID A . The end-users denote the patients of hospital ID A . The brief process of our storage architecture is listed as follows. For the sake of description, the corresponding flowchart is illustrated in Fig. 2 3) The hospital sends re-signing key rk A→B to the proxy (MEC). 4) The end-user encrypts the outsourced data m to obtain the ciphertext C and produces the corresponding signature δ [1] on the ciphertext's hash value H (C). And then it uploads (H (C), C, δ [1] ) to MEC. 5) After MEC verifies the validity of δ [1] , it converts δ [1] into hospital administrator's signature δ [2] , and uploads (δ [2] , C, H (C)) to the cloud via core networks and saves H (C) in local. 6) The end-user issues a data retrieving query with (H (C), σ [1] ) for MEC, where σ [1] denotes a signature of a query message. 7) After MEC verifies the validity of the signature σ [1] , it converts σ [1] into the hospital administrator's signature σ [2] and submits (H (C), σ [2] ) to the cloud. 8) After the cloud checks the validity of σ [2] , and returns the ciphertext C and its signature δ to MEC. 9) Finally, MEC return (C, δ) to the end-user. In the whole storage architecture, the most pivotal procedure is to covert the end-user's signature into the hospital administrator's signature. Its main role is to conceal the end-user's identity and to convince the cloud that the outsourced data is from the hospital. To achieve it, we study a light-weight ID-based proxy re-signature technique in this paper.
V. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL OF ID-BASED PRS A. DEFINITION
In this work, we only discuss unidirectional and single-use non-interactive ID-based PRS since it sufficiently satisfies our storage architecture. Because the non-interactive ID-based PRS scheme avoids the interaction between the end-user and the hospital and removes certificate maintenance, it reduces communication overhead and computation cost of the end-user, and is suitable to our storage architecture. For a non-interactive ID-based PRS scheme (ID-PRS), it is composed of the following algorithms:
• (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify) denote system setup algorithm, key extract algorithm, signing and verifying algorithms of a standard ID-based signature scheme.
• Re-Signing key(Params, sk B , ID A , ID B ) → rk A→B : For this probabilistic algorithm, it inputs public-parameters Params, a delegatee's identity ID A and a delegator's identity ID B as well as the delegator's private key sk B , and outputs the re-signing key rk A→B .
• Re-signature (Params, rk A→B , m, sig A , ID A , ID B ) → sig B . For this algorithm, it inputs public-parameters Params, the re-signing key rk A→B and the delegatee's first-level signature δ A on message m, as well as identity information ID A and ID B , and outputs the second-level signature sig B which cannot be converted anymore.
B. SECURITY MODEL
To show the unforgeability of the proposed ID-PRS scheme, we divide security models into external security and internal security inspired by Ateniese-Hohenberger's security model [6] .
1) EXTERNAL SECURITY
External security means that the outside adversaries can launch security attacks. These outside adversaries are different from the proxy, the delegatee and the delegator. Their target is to create the delegetee's signature or the delegator's signature on a new message m * . Under this security model, the adversary can adaptively issue signature queries and re-signature queries. The security requires the following VOLUME 7, 2019 probability be ignorable.
where O sign (·) denotes a signing oracle which taking a message m and an identity ID i , i ∈ {1, · · · , n} as inputs to output a first-level signature σ [1] ; O Resign denotes a re-signature oracle which takes ID i and ID j , and the message m as well as the first-level signature σ [1] of ID i , and outputs a second-level signature σ [2] of ID j . And Q denotes a set of signer-message pairs
Note that it is unnecessary for the adversary to issue the second-level signature query since it can be obtain by issuing re-signature query and the first-level signature query.
2) INTERNAL SECURITY
Internal security means that the scheme can be against the attacks which are from internal entities such as dishonest proxy, malicious delegators or malicious delegatees. For different entities, internal security is divided into three types of different security games. 1) Limited Proxy Security: this security ensures that the dishonest proxy is unable to create a signature of messages on behalf of the delegatee or the delegator unless message had already been signed by the delegatees. The notion requires the following probability be neglected:
where O sign (·) denotes an oracle which simulates the first-level signature algorithm which outputs a signature when inputting an identity ID i , a message m and a condition c. Q denotes a set of three triple (i, m, c). 2) Delegatee Security: The goal of this security property is to protect the delegatee to resist the collusion attack of the delegator and the proxy. For the sake of clarity, let the index of the delegatee be 0. In the security game, the adversary is allowed to issue a signing query to obtain the first-level signature of the delegatee. The proxy and the delegator are considered as the adversaries. They can generate re-signing key and obtain the second-level signature by re-signing key. The adversary's purpose to fabricate the first-level signature of a new message (or condition). The notion requires the following probability be neglected:
where Q denotes the set of 2-tuple (message,condition) which are queried to O Sign (0, ·). Here σ * denotes the first-level signature. 3) Delegator Security: The aim of this security is to protect the delegator from collusion attack between the delegatee and the proxy. For the sake of clarity, let the index of the delegator be 0. The adversary can access to KeyExtract oracle with ID i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N }. And it can also query signing oracle to obtain the first-level signature of the delegator. The adversary's goal is to fabricate a first-level signature on a new message. The security requires that the probability in the following game be neglected.
where σ * denotes the first-level signature, O sign (·) represents a signature oracle which outputs the first-level signature. Q is a set of three triple (i, m, c).
VI. OUR PROPOSED ID-BASED PROXY RE-SIGNATURE SCHEME
In the following, we will propose a novel non-interactive ID-based PRS scheme with pairing-free. The detailed algorithms are described as below:
• Setup (1 ι ): Let ι denote a security parameter, On inputting ι, the algorithm outputs two safe-large primes p and q which are ι/2 bit-length. And compute N = p · q and ρ = (N − p − q + 5)/8. Next it picks two hash functions H () : {0, 1} * → Q N and h() : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l , where Q N denotes a subgroup of quadratic residues in Z * N and l is the output length of hash function, in general l = 160. At last, public parameters mpk = (N , H (·), h(·)) are published and master private key msk = (p, q, d) is securely stored.
• Extract(ID, msk, mpk): Given a user's identity information ID, on inputting ID, master private key msk and public parameters mpk, the algorithm calculates the user's private key as below:
• Re-signing key(ID A , ID B , sk B ): On inputting the delegatee Alice's identity ID A and the delegator Bob's private key sk B , the algorithm picks γ ∈ Z N at random to produce the re-signing key
where τ = γ 2 . Finally, rk A→B is returned.
• = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) . Note that the algorithm does not appear in most of proxy re-signature schemes since it is implicit. Thus, it can be omitted.
• Re-signature(m, sig A , ID A , rk A→B ) : Given the delegatee Alice's signature sig A = (δ A , R A ) of message m and Alice's identity ID A , the proxy utilizes its re-signing key rk A→B to calculate as below: 1) Firstly, it verifies the validity of sig A = (δ A , R A ).
2) If the equation δ
holds, then the re-signature is produced as follows:
• Verify(m, sig i ): Given a signature sig i where i ∈ {A, B}, its verification is divided into two cases: 1) if signature sig i = sig A , then the verifier computes
If it holds, then it means that sig i is a valid signature, otherwise, output invalid. 2) if signature sig i = sig B , then the verifier computes
If it holds, then it means that sig i is a valid signature, otherwise, output invalid.
Correctness: For the proposed ID-based PRS scheme, it is easily demonstrated to be correct since
It means that a genuinely converted proxy re-signature must satisfy the above verification equation. Thus, our proposed scheme is correct.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
For a unidirectional single-use ID-PRS scheme, it might suffer from external attack and internal attack. Thus, for these two types of attacks, we will show that our proposed ID-PRS scheme is existential unforgeability under adaptively chosen message attack and adaptively chosen identity in the ROM. We will use a technique similar to [29] and [22] to prove external security and internal security of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1: Our proposed ID-PRS scheme can provide external security under the large number factorization assumption in Z N .
Proof : Assume that Adv 1 is an adversary which are capable of breaking our proposed ID-PRS scheme in a non-neglectable advantage, then we can create a novel algorithm B 1 to solve large number factorization problem by invoking Adv 1 as a subroutine. Let N = p · q be a large number, where p, q are unknown for B 1 . B 1 's goal is to output p and q in a non-neglectable probability. In setup phase, B 1 transmits public parameters and N to the adversary Adv 1 . And then Adv 1 is permitted to issue a sequence of queries with B 1 as below.
• H -queries. While an adversary Adv 1 releases a H-query with ID, if ID has appeared in the H -list initialized to be empty, then H ID is returned. Otherwise, it samples ξ ID ∈ Z * N at random to calculate H ID = ξ 2 ID mod N as response, and appends (ID, H ID , ξ ID ) in the H -list.
• h-queries. While the adversary Adv 1 releases a h-query with a string str i , if str i has appeared in the h-list initialized to be empty, then h str i is returned. Otherwise,B 1 tosses a coin with probability 1/2. If coin i = 0, B 1 samples ρ str i ∈ Z * N at random to calculate h str = 2 · ρ str mod N as its response; if coin i = 1, B 1 samples ρ str i ∈ Z * N at random to calculate h str = 2 · ρ str + 1 mod N as its response. At last, it appends (str i , coin i , , h str i , ρ str i ) to the h-list.
• Key Extract queries: While Adv 1 produces a key-extract query with ID, B 1 firstly looks up ID in the H -list. If ID appears in the H -list, then ξ ID is returned as the user ID's private key, namely, sk ID = ξ ID . Otherwise, it produces a H -query with ID to obtain a tuple of (ID, H ID , ξ ID ), and adds (ID, H ID , ξ ID ) in H -list. Finally, ξ ID is returned as its private key.
• Signing queries: While Adv 1 releases a signing query with (ID, m) , B first issues a Key-Extract-query with ID to acquire ξ ID , and then it randomly picks r ∈ Z N to set R A = r 2 and δ A = r h(m,R 2
A )
· ξ ID mod N . Finally, it returns signature (R A , δ A ) to the adversary Adv 1 .
• Re-signature queries: While Adv 1 releases a re-signature query with (ID A , ID · ξ ID B .
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At last, it sends the re-signature (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) to the adversary Adv 1 . In the end, Adv 1 outputs a forgery re-signature sig * B = (s * 1 , s * 2 , s * 3 ) or a forgery signature sig * A = (δ * A , R * A ) on message m * in a non-ignorable probability with the following constraint conditions: 1) When the outputted signature is the first-level signature sig * A of ID * A , the constraint condition is that ID * A has never been issued key extraction query. 2) When the outputted signature is the second-level sig * B , the constraint condition is that ID * B has never been made key extraction query, and ( * , m * , * , ID * B ) has never been issued a re-signature query. If the forgery signature is the first-level sig * A , then it should satisfy
If the coin * which corresponds to str * = m * ||R * A in h-list satisfies coin * = 0, B 1 outputs failure. Otherwise, it retrieves ρ str * , then we have
It means that According the game above, we know that ξ is randomly selected by B, which is independent from H (ID). The adversary Adv outputs the forgery signature sig i , i ∈ {A, B} in the probability 1/2. To clear analysis, we let A 1 denotes the event of appearing the first-level signature. A 2 denotes the event of appearing the second-level signature. E 1 denotes the event of coin * = 1 in the first-level signature. E 2 denotes the event of coin 2 * = 1 and coin 3 * = 1 in the first-level signature. D denotes the event which two roots are different.
So, the probability that N is factorized is
It means that if the simulation does not abort, when Adv 1 creates a valid forgery, B 1 can factor N in a non-ignorable probability.
Theorem 2: The proposed ID-PRS scheme can provide the limited proxy security under the large number factorization assumption in Z N .
Proof : The limited proxy security means that the scheme can prevent a dishonest proxy from forging a signature on a new message.
Assume that there exists an adversary Adv 2 breaking the limited proxy security in our proposed scheme, then we can create an algorithm B 2 to solve the large number factorization problem. To do so, B 2 needs a series of queries.
For H-Queries,h-Queries, KeyExtract Queries and Signing Queries, They are the same as those of Theorem 1.
Re Eventually, A 2 outputs a forged signature in a nonnegligible advantage. By the same analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, B 2 can obtain the factorization of N in a non-ignorable probability.
Theorem 3: Our proposed scheme can achieve delegatee security under the large number factorization assumption in Z N .
Proof : For delegatee security, the goal of this property is to protect the delegatee from the collusion attack between the delegator and the proxy. Because our proposed scheme is non-interactive and the delegator can independently generate re-signing key by its private key sk ID B , Re-signing key queries is unnecessary. For H-Queries,h-Queries, KeyExtract Queries and Signing Queries, They are the same as those of Theorem 1.
In this end, Adv 3 outputs a forged signature in a non-negligible advantage. By the same analysis in the proof of Theorem 1, B 3 can obtain the factorization of N in a non-ignorable probability.
Theorem 4: Our proposed scheme can achieve delegator security under the RSA assumption in Z N .
Proof : For delegator security, the goal of this property is to protect the delegator from the collusion attack between the delegatee and the proxy. Let the delegator's index be 0. Assume that (N , 2, y) is an instance of the RSA problem, its goal is to output x which satisfying x 2 = y mod N . For H-Queries,h-Queries, KeyExtract Queries and Signing Queries, They are the same as those of Theorem 1.
Re 
According to rewind technology [3] , we replay the aforementioned game between Adv 4 and B 4 with the same random tape, and h-queries gives the same answer, but H (·)-queries returns a disparate response for the same inputs ID 0 , namely, H (ID 0 ) = H ID 0 · y. Thus, we can gain another signature sig * A = (R * A , δ * A ) on the same message m * and it also should satisfy
By equation (3) dividing equation (2), we have
It means that y 2 −1 is (
which satisfying x 2 = y mod N . Therefore, the RSA problem can be solved in a non-negligible probability.
VIII. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this part, the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme is given by comparison with other two ID-PRS schemes [2] , [16] with respect to computation cost and security properties. For security properties, the detailed comparison is shown in Table 2 . Unforgeability is the most important property since it determines whether the scheme is significant. From Table 2 , we can find that both the proposed ID-PRS scheme and Shao et al.'s ID-PRS scheme are unforgeable, our proposed scheme and Wang et al.'s scheme are pair-free. In terms of overall function features, the proposed scheme is the best one among these three schemes.
To achieve fair evaluation, we will compare computation cost of these three schemes in terms of Sign, Verify and Resignature. They are performed on a Raspberry-Pi 3B with Linux version 4.14.90 − v7+, an ARMv7rev4(v7l)@1.2GHz processor and 1GB RAM memory. We use PBC library and OpenSSL library to evaluate the time cost of cryptographic operations of ECC and RSA. To achieve the security level of 1024-bit RSA, we select the curve a.param of Type-A pairing, which is denoted as E(F q ) : y 2 = x 3 + x with the embedding degree 2, and the group size q is a 512-bit prime, and the order of the group p is a 160-bit prime. And we also set the bit-length l = 160, and ω = 100 in Shao et al.'s scheme, where l denotes the binary length of message m, and ω denotes the binary length of identity ID. The experiment is run 1000 times to measure runtime for every algorithm, and then we obtain average runtime of every algorithm. Finally, the implementation results are listed in Table 3 . From Table 3 , we know that our scheme is relatively less in terms of computation costs. Although Wang et al.'s scheme has least computation cost, their scheme is insecure. As for Shao et al.'s scheme, computation costs in their scheme are relatively higher. The main computation cost is caused by time-consuming pairing operation. Throughout the above experiment, we can accurately evaluate the computation complexity of each scheme. In conclusion, the overall efficiency of our proposed ID-PRS scheme has some advantages over other two ID-PRS schemes.
IX. CONCLUSION
This work has investigated an IoT network storage architecture based on MEC. To achieve identity privacy and relieve the burden of the end-user, a non-interactive pairing-free ID-based PRS is proposed, which not only avoids expensive pairing operation and complex certificate-maintenance, but also is proven to be secure in the ROM by theoretic analysis. By comparing with other two ID-PRS schemes, the proposed scheme has some advantages in terms of security properties and computation costs. It is upcoming work to extend it into multi-use PRS scheme. 
